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Abstract: Using quarterly call report data from 2000 to 2016, we reexamine the
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effects on NIM, while inflation and deposit-to-loan ratios (D/L) have negative effects.
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1. Introduction
By the summer of 2007, the fallout of the U.S. housing market led banks to report
considerable losses and substantial write downs of their real estate portfolios due to rising
delinquencies and reductions in home values. Factors that contributed to the softening of the
housing market included increasing interest rates between 2003 and 2006 and a greatly reduced
pool of qualified homeowners.1 Furthermore, during this time period, market capitalization of the
major banks became significantly depleted, contributing to the banking turmoil. The ensuing
U.S. financial crisis led to unprecedented government intervention by the U.S. Federal Reserve
and the U.S. Treasury in an attempt to revive the financial system. During the financial crisis
period, bank lending was modest as banks focused on rebuilding liquidity on their balance
sheets. Bank lending to some degree was curtailed by their exposure in real estate portfolios. The
effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis have subsided and bank profitability, for the most part,
has been restored.
There are, of course, many factors that influence bank profitability. Not only business cycles
but also institutional guidelines regarding lending and competition in the industry could be
particularly important. The academic literature reviewed below has evidence on bank profits
responding to interest rates (and other macroeconomic factors), as well as to bank-related
measures, such as: assets, deposits to loan ratios, mortgage portfolios, etc. Perhaps one of the
most relevant terms behind bank profitability is the yield curve. The mechanism is well-known
in the financial press, such as during the recent U.S. presidential election of November 2016,
which led to a substantial market upward response in bond yields: U.S. 10-year benchmark, for

The rate rise, however, may have been less than would have been required had the U.S. Federal Reserve followed
interest rate rules more closely: “To understand why reform is needed, recall that the Fed moved away from a rulesbased policy in 2003-05 when it held the federal funds rate well below what was indicated by the favorable experience
of the previous two decades. The results were not good…” Taylor (2016).
1
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example, moved from 1.7%-1.8% to about 2.3% in a couple of weeks, amid a sell-off in bonds
and a boom in all stock markets. Here is one very recent example summarizing the conventional
wisdom on the yield curve and bank profit margins: “A move higher in interest rates and a
steeper yield curve … suggest bank profits should improve. More relief could be on the way if
the Federal Reserve again increases short-term rates in December. And any move to undo or
lessen regulation could allow banks to return more capital to investors, which in turn would
boost returns on equity. That would lead to higher profits and could argue for higher valuation
multiples, some analysts believe.” (Ensign, The WSJ, November 16, 2016). While often used in
the financial press, there is not to - our knowledge - an effort of quantifying the yield curve on
bank profits.
The literature surrounding the financial crisis has taken various paths focusing on
government intervention (e.g., Cecchetti (2009) and Taylor and Williams (2009)), balance sheet
adjustments of financial intermediaries (e.g., He et al. (2010) and Adrian and Sung (2010)), bank
lending and credit availability (e.g., Cornett et al. (2011), Egly and Mollick (2013), Apergis and
Christou (2015), and Kosak et al. (2015)), and consequences of expansionary monetary policy
for equity markets (e.g., Huang et al. (2016)). Another stream of research re-examines theories of
financial intermediation (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2010), and Acharya et al. (2010)) and
investigates equity markets’ reaction to government regulation enacted in response to the
financial crisis (e.g., Peristian et al. (2010) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2011)). To acquire an
overall economic perspective of the government intervention, Veronesi and Zingales (2010)
calculate the costs (i.e. cost to tax-payers) and benefits (i.e. increased value of banks’ financial
claims) of the government bailout and conclude it was an overall success. They contend that
from an economic viewpoint the government intervention created value by preventing a run on
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banks and by providing capital that reduced banks’ inefficiencies related to excessive leverage.
An interesting area of research which has not received much attention deals with how
economic forces impact bank profitability after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This paper
examines the role of the yield curve on bank net interest margins (a measure of bank
profitability) while controlling for other macro-forces and bank-level characteristics. This study
explores the following research questions: 1) Does bank balance sheet structure and/or bank size
play a role in banks’ net interest margin behavior in response to changes in the yield curve?; 2)
Has bank profitability, captured through net interest margins, been restored to pre-crisis levels?;
and 3) What has been the impact of the yield curve on bank net margins during a period of
unprecedented government intervention and U.S. expansionary monetary policy? Examining the
impact of economic forces on bank profitability is particularly appealing given the significant
transformation in financial intermediation, the gradual shift in sources of bank revenue (i.e.
interest income vs. fee income), and the path of the yield curve over the time frame of our study
which covers periods of economic expansion and contraction. The banking turmoil and the
subsequent 2007-2009 financial crisis motivate the importance of understanding the main
elements of bank profitability. The motivation for this research is also driven by the recent Basel
III Accord. Using data from 1990 to 2007 for several industrial countries, Bolt et al. (2012) claim
that the Accord urged banks to retain additional profits and payout fewer dividends when Tier 1
capital buffers are below required levels. Revisiting how the yield curve impacts bank
profitability is important since the overall functioning and wellbeing of the U.S. economy hinges
on a stable financial system with well-capitalized profit-generating financial institutions
operating in an economy with historically low interest rates since the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it complements the body of research
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in the financial press that offers viewpoints on the impact of the yield curve on bank profits
largely based on circumstantial evidence. Our paper studies the profit behavior of U.S. banks
during a period of significant transformation in the banking system, in which the key driving
force of profits remains the price of lending long and borrowing short.
Second, in contrast to previous studies, this research covers a sample period from 2000Q1 to
2016Q4, which includes the mild recession of 2001, economic expansion (including the peak and
subsequent bust of the housing bubble), the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and economic
recovery. During the time frame of this study, we witnessed major swings in the yield curve.
This invites a re-assessment of the relationship between the key variable of interest and bank net
interest margins especially in light of shifts in bank’s sources of revenues over the years and
swings in the U.S. economy captured by real GDP growth, as documented by Stiroh (2004).
Using annual call report data from 1978 to 2000, he finds that greater reliance on non-interest
income, particularly trading revenue, is associated with lower risk-adjusted profits and higher
risk.
Third, the work by Bolt et al. (2012) combines theory and evidence of bank behavior. This
paper borrows their empirical framework but moves focus to the U.S. banking system examining
individual bank quarterly data, while their work examines both individual and aggregate bank
annual data for 17 countries. The sample period in our work extends beyond theirs (from 1990 to
2007) to capture the recession of 2007-2009 that led short-term interest rates to zero, looks at
four different asset classes of banks, and combines macro factors along with bank controls to
explain net interest margins. In this way, we apply panel data methods to a very large number of
U.S. banks following a four-size classification scheme based on asset size that yields 4,981 small
banks, 475 medium banks, 34 large banks, and 14 money-center banks to examine sensitivity of
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bank profitability to fluctuations in the yield curve. This represents an important departure from
existing studies at quarterly frequency that typically considers a small number of largest banks.
For the U.S., for example, at quarterly frequency and under a similar time span than ours it is
possible to mention the 10 commercial banks studied by Apergis and Cooray (2015) and 16 retail
banks examined in the theoretical model by Egan et al. (2017). In addition to the full sample
covering 2000Q1 through 2016Q4, also modeled are two important subsample periods; the first
subsample “initial period” runs from 2000Q1 through 2009Q2 (June 2009 marks the end of the
U.S. recession according to the NBER) while the second subsample, identified as a “recovery
period”, starts in 2009Q3 and ends in 2016Q4.
Controlling for bank balance composition (namely deposits-to-loans) and macro forces, our
findings show that the yield curve has a positive effect on bank net interest margins that varies
with bank size. We also find that the yield curve’s effect on bank net interest margins changes
across time with greater impact during the recovery period compared to the initial period. For all
banks, real GDP growth positively impacts bank net interest margins over the full sample period.
The effect of real GDP on bank net interest margins also increases during the recovery period.
We present evidence that important shifts in the yield curve are mirrored by changes in net
interest margins, albeit of lesser magnitude for the smaller bank samples when compared to the
larger bank samples. We also document that net interest margins have been fairly stable for the
small and medium bank samples, yet generally decline for the large and money-center bank
samples in the post crisis period, an era of unparalleled U.S. government intervention and U.S.
expansionary monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 introduces the empirical models, along with our working
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hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2. The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample draws from the population of commercial banks that are insured through the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) over the time period 2000Q1 to 2016Q4. The
bank information is compiled in Consolidated Reports of Condition “call reports” that are
submitted quarterly by insured banks. The bank data used for this study are available through
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation statistics on depository institutions (SDI) database at the
following website: http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (last accessed on 5/14/17).
Since this research deals with bank-level data, data is drawn from the lead bank in the case of
multibank holding companies (BHC). In many instances the lead bank commonly represents
over 80% of the total insured assets reported by the BHC.2 Banks with missing balance sheet
and/or income information required for this study are excluded from the sample. Following
Loutskina (2011), this research applies several qualifiers to the population of commercial banks
to minimize the impact of outliers. We eliminate all bank-quarter data with asset growth over the
preceding quarter in excess of 50%, total loan growth exceeding 100%, and total loans-to-assets
ratio of less than 10%. By applying these qualifiers to the population of FDIC insured
commercial banks, 192,408 bank quarter observations are removed from the initial data set with
the final full sample containing 319,927 bank quarters.
The bank information extracted for this study includes: 1) net interest margin computed as
total interest income less total interest expense divided by average earning assets, 2) total assets,

2

To investigate the presence of multibank holding companies, we extract a list of the largest 150 financial institutions as of the
beginning of the sample. We match each of these institutions against the FDIC website to determine if they are BHC. The
number of banks excluded that form part of a BHC represents less than 2% of the total sample. The lead banks of BHC are
retained for this research.
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3) total loans, and 4) FDIC insured domestic deposits less than $100,000.3 To examine behavior
patterns of the commercial banks across asset sizes, the sample is decomposed into various
subsample classifications following Verma and Jackson (2008). The bank sample is divided into
four groups based on average total asset size as of beginning of period as follows: small banks
(average total assets < U.S. $1 billion), medium banks (average total assets ≥ U.S. $1 billion and
< U.S. $20 billion), large banks (average total assets ≥ U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion)
and money- center banks (average total assets ≥ U.S. $90 billion).4
Two important subsample periods are considered; the first covers 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
(June 2009 represents the end of the 2007-2009 U.S. recession) and the second starts on 2009Q3
and runs through 2016Q4. The first subsample period covers an important time span that
encompasses the tail-end of the economic boom period of the 1990s, the U.S. stock market crash
of 2000 and the burst of the dot-com bubble, the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, the housing
bubble and subsequent bust in the summer of 2007, major oil price hikes in international markets
during 2008, and the 2007-2009 credit crisis. Our second subsample, which runs from 2009Q3
through 2016Q4, is identified as our “recovery” period. During this time frame although we have
witnessed short term interest rates at near zero levels and generally declining long term interest
rates, economic growth (measured through real GDP) has been admittedly modest. In addition,
pieces of legislation, such as Dodd-Frank in 2010, were passed towards the banking system
signaling more regulation.

3

The deposit threshold for FDIC reporting purposes increased to $250,000 effective September 2009. Due to the change in
FDIC deposit threshold coverage, SDI reporting of insured deposits was also revised (SDI variable code name “depsmamt”
replaced with “iddepsam”).
4 It is plausible that some banks that meet this minimum size indicator at the beginning of the sample period could fall below the
minimum threshold especially during the 2007-2009 financial crisis period in which some banks experienced heavy losses and
large write downs in their real estate portfolios. We choose to retain in the sample those banks that may fall below the size
threshold in any given quarter since it is not anticipated that these banks in the near term would necessarily make major changes
to their funding sources or their business model.
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Table 1 Panels A through E presents descriptive information on the banks classified as small,
medium, large, and money-center, and for all banks combined for our full sample and two
subsample periods. For example, Panel A comprises the small banks subsample, in which Panel
A.1 has the full sample, A.2 has the first subsample (2000Q1 to 2009Q2) and A.3 has the second
subsample (2009Q3 to 2016Q4). Panels B, C, and D do the same for other class sizes, and panel
E reports all banks together.
Some interesting results emerge under this bank classification scheme. The dependent
variable in our regression models (net interest margin) declines modestly as overall bank size
increases over our full sample period (refer to Panels A.1, B.1, C.1, and D.1). Within each bank
size classification, mean net interest margins are on a downward trend with money-center and
small banks (large and medium banks) experiencing the greatest (least) net interest margin
erosion. For example, the mean net interest margin for money-center banks exhibits a decline of
close to 50 basis points (0.510%) from 3.454% in the initial period as shown in Panel D.2 to
2.944% in the recovery period as reported in Panel D.3. The medium, large and money-center
bank samples are reporting increasing volatility (measured through the difference in magnitudes
of standard deviations) during the recovery period compared to the initial period while the small
bank sample shows declining volatility in NIMs.
Overall these findings suggest that funding sources differ as bank size changes (i.e. a shift
from less expensive “core deposits”, usually a key funding source for smaller banks, towards
more expensive, and rate sensitive, “purchased funds”, which largely support money-center bank
activities). The alternative maturity strategies commonly employed by banks for managing their
investment portfolios may help explain the difference in net interest margin volatility patterns.
There are some important differences in the balance sheet mix between smaller and larger
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banks. When scaled by mean total assets, banks’ exposure to loans declines as overall bank size
rises for our full sample period (e.g. the ratio of total-mean-loans-to-mean-assets is 65% for
small banks calculated from Table 1 Panel A.1 compared to 50% for money-center banks from
Table 1 Panel D.1). This finding is consistent with the view that the type of activities banks
engage is normally influenced by bank size. For example, small banks usually focus on the retail
side of banking while large banks tend to emphasize wholesale banking. Examining the data
between the initial and recovery periods within each bank size classification, we see that the ratio
of total-mean-loans-to-mean-assets is generally declining suggesting a liquidity build-up by
banks (e.g. this pattern is most noticeable in the money-center bank sample). The liquidity build
up by all bank groups between the initial and recovery periods is also evidenced by the increase
in the ratio of total-mean-deposits-to-mean-assets with the large banks reporting the greatest
build up (refer to Table 1 Panel C.2 and C.3) followed by medium and small banks (ratios
derived from Table 1 Panels B.2 and B.3, and Panels A.2 and A.3, respectively). The total-meanloans-to-mean-deposit ratios reveal a downward trend in all bank samples between the initial and
recovery periods and are generally larger as bank size increases. This finding supports the view
that larger banks typically have greater access to capital and money markets, including
repurchase agreement markets compared to their smaller counterparts.
The main variable of interest in our study is the yield curve (maturity risk premium) defined
as the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond Constant Maturity rate (series GS10)
and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate (series TB3MS) which are in monthly frequency
downloadable from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2
(data retrieved on 5/14/2017). The inverted yield curve depicted in Figure 1 (from 2000Q1 to
2000Q4) is consistent with large-scale repurchases of long-term Treasury bonds by the U.S.
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Treasury in early 2000 which reduced the supply of bonds and their respective yields. The graph
reflects the U.S. economy entering a recessionary period (from 2001Q1 to 2001Q4) highlighted
by the burst of the dot-com bubble, a reduction in business investments and outlays, and the
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. A second prolonged inverted yield curve begins in
2004Q2 and runs through 2007Q1. This suggests that investors were expecting Fed induced
reductions in interest rates in fear of a looming recession. During this time frame, the U.S.
economy witnessed staggering growth in residential construction and subprime mortgage lending
which created a housing bubble. The quality of the subprime mortgage portfolio led to weak and
questionable bank balance sheets which induced banks to hoard liquidity placing upward
pressure on interest rates.5
Table 1 Panel F provides details on our macroeconomic variables. The mean of the yield
curve is close to 2% over the period, but it is lower in the first subsample (1.68%) than in the
second (2.39%). The reason the yield curve becomes steeper is that the fall in short-run rates
guided by the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policies was larger than the fall in longrun rates: the decline in long-run rates was of 200 basis points; the decline in short-run rates was
close to 271 basis points! Inflation fell during the crisis and economic growth was higher in the
recovery since the first subsample includes the negative growth during the 2007-2009 crisis. If
the yield curve helps explain bank profitability, its effect should be higher in the second
subsample. Regarding profitability, Table 1, Panels E.1-E.3 shed light on bank data: NIM has
mean of 3.931% over the whole sample but that comes with a decline in second subsample:
mean of 4.066% in first subsample against 3.740% in second, which likely reflects the increase

5

The 1- month London Interbank Offered (LIBOR) rate increased from 1.36% at 6/30/04 to 5.32% at 3/30/07- source: Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. The LIBOR is a common benchmark rate used by the world’s largest banks for inter-bank short
term borrowings.
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in the deposit/loan ratio (overall mean of 55.41%) in second subperiod: mean of 47.94% in first
subsample against 61.38% in second.
< Insert Figure 1 about here >
Contemporaneous bivariate correlations are computed for the: 1) bank variables, 2) macro
variables, and 3) yield curve for the full sample and two subsample periods on banks classified
as small, medium, large, and money-center, and for all banks combined6. Correlation results
suggest that bank behavior is not fully consistent across all subsamples. To illustrate this point,
the correlation between net interest margin and deposits-to-loans over our full sample period is
negative, yet very small in magnitude for the small, medium bank samples (-0.014 and -0.026,
respectively), moderately negative for the large bank sample (-0.129) and moderately positive at
0.252 for the money-center bank sample. Negative correlations become larger in magnitude for
small and large banks moving from the initial period to the recovery period, while the positive
correlation becomes stronger for money-center banks. These negative correlations suggest that
liquidity build-ups (captured through an increase in the ratio of deposit to loans) are
accompanied by a contemporaneous decline in net interest margins. This finding is plausible to
the extent that excess funds/liquidity are invested in lower yielding assets instead of funding
higher earning (and inherently more risky) loan opportunities.
There is a positive, yet weak, co-movement between net interest margins and real GDP
growth hovering between 0.028 and 0.038 for the small, medium, and large banks increasing to
0.051 for our money-center banks over the full sample period. Interestingly, in each bank size
classification the co-movement either essentially dissipates or turns negative, with values
approaching zero in the recovery period. Findings provide some support for the cyclical nature of

The correlation tables for each class of bank sizes are available from the authors upon request. As reported in the
text, the correlation coefficients are low to moderate.
6
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price-cost margins as explained by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011), who report a negative
bivariate contemporaneous correlation between net interest margin and real GDP growth albeit
of a greater magnitude (e.g. -0.2039 based on U.S. bank quarterly data from 1979-2005). The
positive co-movement between net interest margin and real GDP growth captured in our full
sample period seems in line with Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009). They explain that
improvements in economic conditions are accompanied by concurrent increases in loan demand
and improved financial condition of borrowers with positive effects on the profitability of
traditional financial intermediation activities.
Another interesting correlation pattern emerges between net interest margin and the yield
curve which varies based on bank size. Over the full sample period, correlation is negative for
small and medium banks (-0.074 and -0.032, respectively), near zero for the large banks, and
positive, yet small at 0.033 for the money-center banks. The correlation between the net interest
margin and the yield curve strengthens for the larger bank samples as we move from the initial
period to the recovery period (e.g. from 0.111 to 0.219 for money-center banks) and changes
direction for the smaller bank samples (e.g. from -0.045 to 0.037 for small banks).
With the exception of positive correlation between long-term and short-term interest rates
variables ranging from 0.786 in the initial period to 0.838 in the full sample period, the yield
curve and long term interest rates correlations ranging from -0.319 in the full sample period to
0.980 in the recovery period, and the negative correlations of -0.784 and -0.929 between the
yield curve and short term interest rates in the full sample and initial periods (correlation remains
negative at -0.314 during the recovery period), all other correlations are either low or moderate.
The low-to-moderate correlations help mitigate any potential collinearity issues that could
impact the profitability models, noting that in no model we allow the aforementioned highly
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correlated variables to jointly enter a single model simultaneously.
To explore the impact of real output on bank net interest margins we incorporate a real GDP
growth rate (RGDP) variable. RGDP is measured as a quarterly growth rate variable calculated
from the GDPC1 series US Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars.
This series is of quarterly frequency and seasonally adjusted downloadable from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: http:// research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on, 5/14/2017).
Figure 2 our bank profit variable (Net Interest Margin), provides preliminary support to the procyclicality of bank profitability and real output growth as suggested by Bolt et al. (2012). They
find that the co-movement between bank profits and real GDP is much stronger during deep
recessions compared to normal economic conditions. Our graphs add on this point for U.S. banks
and the economy. In Figure 2, NIM is declining overall; only money center banks have a
significant upside during the 2007-2009 crisis; this did not happen in 2001 when all categories of
banks had NIM increase by the end of the milder recession of 2001.
< Insert Figure 2 about here >
Also included is an inflation rate variable to control for its effects on bank net interest
margins. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) suggest that traditional intermediation activity is less
profitable during periods of high inflation that penalize lenders; to counter the negative impact,
banks tend to redirect their efforts towards fee based activities during inflationary periods.
Inflation erodes the real rate of return to investors holding deposits which generates a
disincentive. Inflation rate is measured as a quarterly growth rate variable for modeling purposes
(expressed in percentage) and constructed from the Consumer Price Index series CPIAUCNS
(index 1982-1984=100). The series is of monthly frequency, not seasonally adjusted, and
downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: http:// research.stlouisfed.org/fred2
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(data retrieved on, 5/14/2017).

3. Methodology
Given the cross-section and time series dimensions of the bank sample data sets, panel
estimation techniques are employed to examine the impact of the yield curve on the net interest
margin of FDIC insured commercial banks over the period 2000 through 2016. We introduce a
profitability model that incorporates bank-specific determinants (deposits-to-loans ratio as
described in the preceding Data section) and macro-variables following Bolt et al. (2012). This
modeling approach recognizes that net interest income, which is a substantial component of bank
profit, depends on the full history of outstanding loan balances and deposits and their respective
interest rates. To the extent that higher deposits to loan ratios capture higher levels of bank
liquidity, as opposed to loan portfolio build-up, we anticipate an inverse relationship between
deposits-to-loans ratios and net interest income. The inverse relationship is consistent with the
notion that purchases of large volumes of liquid, readily-marketable securities tend to lower the
average yield from a bank’s earning assets and reduce its profitability.
The macro-variables used in this model consist of the yield curve, real GDP growth rate, and
inflation rate also described in the Data section. The focus on the impact of the yield curve on net
interest margins is to validate the common belief that bank managers (lenders) fare better with an
upward-sloping yield curve than they do under a horizontal or downward-sloping yield curve.
Bank’s earning assets (loans and securities) usually tend to exhibit longer maturities than their
funding sources (i.e. liabilities). Modern financial theory usually associates upward-sloping yield
curves with rising interest rates and economic expansion. Real GDP growth rate is also included
since it is commonly used in bank profitability model; see Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009),
15

Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011), and Bolt et al. (2012). It is anticipated that there is a direct
relationship between real GDP growth rate and profitability in line with what has generally been
set forth in the literature. Finally, an inflation rate variable is included to account for the
potential loss of the purchasing power of interest income and loan repayments given rising prices
for goods and services. The direction of the relationship arguably depends on bank
management’s ability to fully anticipate (and plan for) inflation expectations suggesting that
banks can adjust their pricing in order to increase revenues to offset rising costs.
Panel estimation is employed to model the impact of the yield curve on bank net interest
margin similar to the empirical specification presented by Bolt et al. (2012). The model is
expressed as follows:
4
4
4
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑𝜏 = 1𝛽1,𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 𝑏𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 + ∑𝜏 = 1𝛽2,𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 + ∑𝜏 = 1𝛽3,𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 𝑦𝑐𝑡 ‒ 𝜏 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

where the ∆ prefix represents the change in the profitability variable 𝑦 consisting of the net
interest margin measured as the difference between total interest income and total interest
expense scaled by average bank earning assets; 𝑏𝑘 denotes our deposits-to-loans variable
expressed in ratio form; 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 consists of a vector of macro-economic variables, which
includes: 1) real GDP growth rate and 2) inflation rate; and 𝑦𝑐 is the yield curve variable that
enters the model in first differences.7 Finally, 𝛼𝑖 represents the bank-specific fixed effects
while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 captures the remaining disturbance term.

7

Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are applied to all macro variables. The null of these
tests is that the series contain unit roots (i.e. non-stationary series). The RGDP growth rate and inflation rate variable series were
stationary in their original form; it is noted that the yield curve (yc) variable is non-stationary in levels yet it becomes stationary
in first differences. Unit root tests are not reported in this study but are available upon request.
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Equation (1) resembles the profitability model introduced by Bolt et al. (2012) while
incorporating a few important differences. First, we exclude long-term and short-term interest
rates and corresponding interaction terms to reduce multi-collinearity and confounding factors.
This is because the yield curve is, by construction, computed from long and short interest rates.
We also remove all right hand side contemporaneous terms from the model to reduce potential
endogeneity issues. Second, our focus is on the U.S. banking system using individual bank
quarterly data while their work explores both individual and aggregate bank annual data for 17
countries. The sample period in this study includes the 2007-2009 financial crisis while their
sample period ends in 2007. Third, the primary contribution by Bolt et al. (2012) is to capture the
asymmetric effects of the business cycle on bank profitability. Comparing the estimated effect of
the yield curve on NIM, relative to other macroeconomic forces and bank data (deposit to loans),
our approach attempts to validate the use of the yield curve by banks as an important maturity
management tool. Besides, it may serve as a nice “market-based” complement to low-frequency
RGDP and bank-specific data alike.
Estimation of our panel model hinges on the assumptions about the intercept (𝛼𝑖), the slope
coefficients (β’s), and the error term (𝜀𝑖,𝑡). Three types of panel data models are considered:
pooled, fixed effects, and random effects models. To the extent that there are neither significant
bank nor temporal effects, we could pool our data and estimate our model using ordinary least
squares. While most of the time there are either differences across units (banks in our case) or
temporal effects, it is plausible to encounter instances when neither of these are statistically
significant in which case a pooled regression model is appropriate. Fixed effects models have
constant slope coefficients and time invariant intercepts that differ according to the crosssectional unit; in other words, the time invariant intercepts capture the assumed heterogeneity
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across the banks. The main question/assumption is whether or not the bank-specific effects (𝛼𝑖)
are correlated with the regressors in our model.
As an initial step the model is estimated using fixed effects assuming differences across units
are captured by differences in the constant intercept term 𝛼𝑖 (our bank-specific fixed effect). This
estimation is the preferred panel data technique assuming that 𝑧𝑖 (a vector of bank-specific
unobserved variables) is correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 (the regressors in our model).8 For example, it is
plausible that bank-specific unobserved factors such as managerial ability, credit cultural and
credit policy, market share objectives, etc. which presumably impact bank profitability may also
be correlated with the bank-specific deposits-to-loans variable. To validate this empirical
approach, a series of diagnostic tests are applied. First, F test results from the fixed effects model
determine whether there are differences across groups (banks). Second, in the pooled least
squares estimations, a Durbin Watson test is applied to detect serial correlation in the residuals.
Third, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is used on the random effects model
based on the OLS residuals. Fourth, the specification test developed by Hausman (1978) is used
to test for the orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors. Under a random effects
specification, an important assumption is that unobserved bank-specific effects 𝛼𝑖 are
uncorrelated with the regressors 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. Under random effects specification, unobserved bankspecific effects are treated as a random variable (with a mean value of 𝛼) similar to 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 except
that for each bank there is a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period. See
Greene (2003) for details. The results section reports model specifications as supported by the

8

If 𝑧𝑖 is unobserved yet correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 the least squares estimator of 𝛽 is biased and inconsistent due to an omitted variable.
'

'

However, in the instance where the model is 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝛼 embodies all observable effects, an estimable
conditional mean equation can be specified. See Greene (2003).
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above described diagnostic tests.9
Our profitability model incorporates some noteworthy features. First, similar to Verma and
Jackson (2008), the bank sample is divided into four asset size classes to determine whether bank
behavior patterns that are manifested through the banks’ balance sheet impact net interest
margins differently. Second, up to four lags of right hand variables are allowed. This is
especially important with regards to the deposits-to-loans variable since a considerable
component of bank profit, rests on the full history of outstanding loan balances and deposits and
their respective interest rates. Third, this study allows for the interaction between inflation and
deposits-to-loans to capture the indirect impact of inflation on net interest margins through the
bank’s balance sheet. The purpose behind this interaction term is to determine whether
inflationary pressures operate through the bank’s balance sheet. For example, banks with high
credit risk exposure in their loan portfolios would be expected to hoard more cash (high liquidity
risk exposure) compared to bank with lower credit risk exposure in their portfolio during periods
of crisis. The need to build liquidity places pressure on net interest margins due to rising liquidity
costs which could be further exasperated during a period of rising interest rate expectations
(which commonly factor in inflation expectations).
To investigate the impact of the 2007–2009 financial crisis on net interest margins, we
expand our benchmark model by adding a crisis dummy variable. The expanded model takes the
following form:
(2)
where the Δ prefix represents the change in the profitability variable y consisting of the net
interest margin measured as the difference between total interest income and total interest
expense scaled by average bank earning assets as in Equation 1; crisis represents a dummy
variable that enters the model as an independent regressor with one lag and takes on a value of
one during the crisis period from 2007Q4 through 2009Q2 and zero otherwise; and all other
right-hand side variables (i.e., bk, macro, and yc) are the same as those described in our
benchmark model.
9

As a robustness exercise, we run our bank profitability model applying pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects
estimation. Central findings remain qualitatively unchanged. For brevity, the fixed effects and random effects estimations are
reported only as our diagnostic tests support this panel data approach. Pooled OLS regression results are not reported in this study
but are available upon request.
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Finally,

represents the bank-specific fixed effects while

captures the remaining

disturbance term.
The growing uncertainty with respect to the value of banks’ balance sheets was at the
core of the financial crisis and was captured by sharp increases in money market rates. The
rising uncertainty about the value of the banks’ balance sheets prompted banks to hoard cash as
they became concerned about their continued ability to tap into capital markets to cover
their funding requirements. To extent that the 2007–2009 financial crisis captures a period of
high liquidity and counterparty risks, we would anticipate a negative impact of our crisis
variable on net interest margins.
This paper introduces two testable hypotheses as follows. Under the Loanable Funds
theory, when a domestic economy experiences a period of growth, market participants are
willing to borrow more heavily. Holding all other factors constant, the resulting shift in demand
for loanable funds due to economic growth results in an increase in the equilibrium interest rate
and an increase in the equilibrium quantity of funds traded. Because banks’ loans and asset
security holdings tend to have longer maturities than their sources of funds, it is reasonable to
anticipate a positive relationship between an upward-sloping yield curve and net interest
margins. To the degree that banks experience a positive maturity gap between the average
maturities of their assets and the average maturities of their liabilities, revenues from longerterm assets should exceed expenses from shorter-term liabilities under an upward-sloping yield
curve condition. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: There is a direct relationship between the yield curve and bank profitability expressed
through its net interest margin. We hypothesize β3 > 0 in equation (1) but the response is
likely to differ across bank samples.
Research on the determinants of bank profit margins by Angbazo (1997) and Aliaga-Diaz
and Olivero (2011), among others, suggests that the cyclical behavior of bank profit margins
may be explained through channels other than monetary policy and credit risk. Monetary policy
is believed to have a direct effect on net profit margins through the bank lending channel; for
example,
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an increase in the fed funds rate leads to a reduction in lending and increased borrowing costs.
These actions in turn force banks to make upward adjustments in their net interest margins to
cover the rising costs. If, as expected, higher credit risk is linked to periods of declining
economic activity then banks must increase their net interest margins to cover their cost of
capital due to the increased risk exposure. In a strong economy credit is readily available,
interest rates are manageable, demand for goods and services is generally favorable, which are
elements that support profitability for well managed firms, including banks. Albertazzi and
Gambacorta (2009) suggest that an improvement in economic conditions increases lending
demand by households and firms and improves the financial conditions of borrowers, with
positive effects on the profitability of the traditional financial intermediation activities. The
second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: There is a positive relationship between the real GDP growth rate and bank
profitability expressed through its net interest margin. Since real GDP growth rate is a
variable contained in macro, we hypothesize β2 > 0 in equation (1).
4. Results
Table 2 reports results from the panel model specification applied to the small, medium,
large, and money center bank samples and for all banks combined for our full sample period. The
dependent variable in all models is the one period change in the net interest margin scaled by
average bank earning assets.
We will discuss the results for all banks first (last columns in Tables 2-4) and then move to
other class sizes later. Results are statistically significant with both positive and negative
coefficients on the real GDP growth variable (the first two lags are positive and the fourth lag is
negative and statistically significant), with positive net effect (sum of 1.240 across the four
quarters) of real GDP growth on net interest margins. Thus a 0.1% increase in the quarterly real
GDP growth rate favorably impacts the change in net interest margins by 0.124%. Evaluating
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this coefficient at the mean of 0.005 (translates to 0.5% in percent terms) quarterly GDP growth
reported in Table 1, Panel F.1, the overall impact on the change in net interest margins is 0.0062
or 0.62%, positive but not very large. Our finding differs from Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011),
who report a negative (yet statistically insignificant) effect of GDP on net interest margins on
their quarterly data on U.S. banks for the period 1979-2005. Bolt et al. (2012) find that real GDP
has a significant negative influence on net interest income as a stand-alone regressor that turns
positive when interacted with long-term interest rates. Our result is consistent with Albertazzi
and Gambacorta (2009) who find a direct relationship between real GDP and net interest margins
(RGDP coefficient of 0.648) in their study of annual aggregate bank data from 1981 to 2003 for
10 industrialized countries including the U.S.
For the yield curve, results are also statistically significant for the first three lags (the first is
negative and the other two are positive and statistically significant), with positive net effect of
0.037 across quarters of changes in yield curve on net interest margins. Therefore, the change in
net interest margins grows by 3.70% given a 1% increase in the slope of the yield curve.
Evaluating this coefficient at the mean of 1.972 of yield curve reported in Table 1, Panel F.1, the
overall impact is 0.0730 or 7.30%, positive and larger than the RGDP effect. Bolt et al. (2012)
report a positive net effect of 0.110 across quarters (only first lag being significant) on the impact
of the yield curve on net interest margins based individual bank data. For inflation, results are
statistically significant with both positive and negative coefficients (the first lag is positive and
statistically significant and the other three lags are negative), with negative net effect (sum of
-9.162 across quarters) of inflation on net interest margins. This suggests that a 0.1% increase in
the quarterly inflation growth rate negatively impacts the change in net interest margins by 0.916%. At the mean inflation level, the overall impact on NIM is -0.0183 or -1.83%, which is
higher (in absolute value) than the growth effect but not as high as the impact from the yield
curve. Bolt et al. (2012) find that inflation has a significant positive effect on net interest income
as a stand-alone regressor that turns negative when interacted with short-term interest rates.
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Our finding contrasts with Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), who report a statistically
insignificant effect of inflation on net interest margins. Similarly, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero
(2011) find that inflation has no impact on net interest margins in their study. Overall, our
results suggests that the positive impact of yield curve on NIM outweighs the negative impact of
inflation and the positive impact of economic growth over the whole sample.
Under an alternative specification, we incorporate a financial crisis dummy variable to our
benchmark model (enters the model with one lag) to assess the impact of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis on net interest margins. As expected, we find a negative and statistically significant impact
of the crisis on net interest margins e.g. coefficients of -0.057, -0.059, -0.087,-0.061, and -0.054
for small, medium, large, money center, and all banks, respectively.10 This result aligns with
Figure 2 that shows sharply reduced net interest margins for each bank size during the financial
crisis period compared to non-crisis periods. The above coefficients, which measure the average
difference in net interest margins between the 2007-2009 financial crisis and non-crisis periods,
suggest that during the financial crisis, net interest margins were lower by roughly 5-6 basis
points for the small, medium, and money center banks and close to 9 basis points for large banks.
Our findings nicely complement Egly and Mollick (2013) who conclude that the U.S. Treasury
capital purchase program’s (CPP) objective to boost loan growth and business activity during the
crisis remained unfulfilled .
The subsamples provide a nice complement to the main hypothesis in this paper. According
to Table 3 for the first subsample, real GDP growth variable has negative net effects (sum of
-0.826 across quarters) on net interest margins which translates to an unfavorable impact of
-0.026% on the change in net interest margins per every 0.1% increase in real GDP growth.
Assessing this coefficient at the mean of 0.004 quarterly GDP growth (see Table 1, Panel F.2),
the overall impact is -0.0033 or -0.33% which contrasts with our positive effect recorded in the
full sample. This negative result is in instep with Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011), who show that

10

For brevity, in the narrative we only report the crisis dummy variable coefficients; the alternative estimations (and
related diagnostics) that include the 2007-2009 financial crisis variable are not reported in table form in this study
but are available from the authors upon request.

23

bank profit margins are consistently countercyclical even when controlling for the effects of
credit risk and monetary policy. For the yield curve, there is a positive net effect of 0.026 across
quarters, which evaluated at the mean of 1.679 reported in Table 1, Panel F.2, leads to the overall
impact is 0.0437 or 4.37%, positive and larger than RGDP effects. As for inflation, the negative
net effect (sum of -14.269 across quarters) evaluated at the mean of 0.002 reported in Table 1,
Panel F.2, implies an overall impact of -0.0285 or -2.85%, negative on NIM, which is again
higher (in absolute value) than the effect of economic growth but not as high as the positive
impact from the yield curve.
According to Table 4 for the second subsample, real GDP growth variable has now
positive net effects (sum of 3.608 across quarters) on net interest margins which implies a
favorable impact of 0.361% on the change in net interest margins per every 0.1% increase in real
GDP growth. Based on the mean coefficient of 0.006 quarterly GDP growth reported in Table 1,
Panel F.3, the overall impact becomes 0.0216 or 2.16%. The positive impact of real GDP on net
interest margins supports the view of Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) as described in the data
analysis section of the paper. For the yield curve, there is a positive net effect of 0.034 across
quarters, which evaluated at the mean of 2.388 of yield curve reported in Table 1, Panel F.3, the
overall impact turns out to be an impressive 0.0812 or 8.12%, positive and more than three
times larger than the combined effect of RGDP. As for inflation, there is now a positive net
effect (sum of 4.901 across quarters), which evaluated at the mean of 0.001 reported in Table 1,
Panel F.3 implies an overall impact of 0.0049 or 0.49%, smaller than the largest effect due to the
yield curve and the positive impact on NIM due to RGDP growth since the 2007-2009 crisis.
We are using the deposit/loan ratio as the main variable from the bank asset-liability
composition. As discussed in the data section on Table 1, Panels E.1 to E.3, the D/L ratio
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increased from mean of 47.94% to 61.38%, which reflects the aftermath of the recession and
approval of more government regulation on banks. Making an exercise similar to the macro
factors above, the magnitudes of the effects of deposits/loan - evaluated at sample means –
changes across periods. It is negative overall: -0.0028 or -0.28% for the whole sample (sum of 0.005 evaluated at mean of 0.554), varying from -0.0077 or -0.77% for the first subsample (sum
of -0.016 evaluated at mean of 0.4794) to a positive 0.0411 or 4.11% for the second subsample
(sum of 0.067 evaluated at mean of 0.6138), which suggests an effect not only larger in
magnitude of D/L on NIM more recently, but also changing signs. In the first subsample an
increase in D/L leads to lower profits, all else constant, which is consistent with lower lending
implying lower profits, the basic principle of banking. In the second subsample, the effect of D/L
operates in reverse. To illustrate, in the second subsample, a 1% increase in the D/L ratio would
have a ceteris paribus positive impact of 6.7% on the change in net interest margins. Bolt et al.
(2012) find that D/L ratio has a significant positive effect on net interest income as a stand-alone
regressor that turns negative when interacted with short-term interest rates.
For the whole sample in Table 2, the negative (overall) impact of real GDP growth on net
interest margins reported in money center bank samples is in step with the Aliaga-Diaz and
Olivero (2011), who discuss the cyclical nature of price-cost margins. They suggest that
monetary policy and credit risk are key determinants of the cyclicality of margins with credit risk
having a countercyclical effect (credit is more expensive in bad times and cheaper in good
times). The positive effects of real GDP growth on net interest margins reported in the small,
medium, and large bank samples supports the previously discussed view of Albertazzi and
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Gambacorta (2009).11 For small banks, the overall impact of the yield curve on net interest
margins is positive yet modest with positive coefficients in three of the four lags with values of
0.005 and 0.032 with a single negative coefficient of -0.008 reported in the first lag. The overall
impact remains positive in the remaining bank samples. This finding support hypothesis one and
is consistent with the practical view that bank managers who emphasize lending are more
profitable under an upward-sloping yield curve scenario than under a flat or downward-sloping
yield curve setting.
Results show a negative impact of inflation on net interest margins for small banks based on
negative and statistically significant coefficients of -1.550, -5.946, and -4.390 in lags two
through four with a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 7.455 reported in lag one.
The overall impact of inflation on net interest remains negative for medium banks, turns positive
in the large sample, and has no impact on the money center bank sample. It is possible that the
overall negative impact depicted in the small and medium bank samples captures the loss of
purchasing power of interest income and loan repayments given rising prices for goods and
services. Conversely, the positive effect of inflation on net interest margins reported in the large
bank sample implies that large banks are better able to manage inflation expectations by

11

The relatively large T (T equals 68 quarters) in our bank profitability model applied to our money center and large
bank samples (14 and 34 banks, respectively), suggests that estimations may align with time series modeling for
these macro-type samples (i.e. T>>N). The population of U.S. commercial banks for our two sub-samples is limited
and thus we focus on T growing larger when considering asymptotic properties of the estimators we employ. To
avoid spurious regression results and to test for time series dynamics, we apply the Fisher-type panel data unit root
tests to our bank variables (panel unit root test results are available upon request). The null of the test is that all
panels contain unit roots; our results support stationary in panel series. We also check for (and do not find) serial
correlation in the error term based on earlier random and fixed effects estimations that allowed for an AR(1)
disturbance process. Other published papers that model bank profitability using random/fixed effects estimation
applied to macro-type samples include: Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) and Bolt et al. (2012).
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adjusting their pricing in order to build revenues to mitigate rising costs. The overall effect of
deposits-to-loans on net interest margins is positive, yet small in the small bank sample case,
based on negative coefficients ranging from -0.004 in lag 4 to -0.164 in lag 1 offset by a positive
coefficient of 0.190 in lag 2. The effect remains positive (yet very small) in the medium bank
sample, turns negative in the large bank sample, and is insignificant in the money center sample
case. This negative impact supports the idea that purchases of large volumes of liquid, readilymarketable securities (in response to weak loan demand) tend to lower the average yield from a
bank’s earning assets and reduce its profitability.
In contrast to Bolt et al. (2012), our results show a direct effect of inflation on net interest
margins operating through the deposits-to-loans ratio of small, medium, and large banks as
evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficients of the interaction term. Results
suggest that as liquidity risk rises and banks respond by building cash holdings, they are able to
“pass on” added liquidity costs through net interest margin adjustments in the small, medium,
and large bank sample cases. We find a statistically significant inverse effect consistent with Bolt
et al. (2012) only in the money center bank sample case.
Table 3 displays the panel model specification applied to the small, medium, large, and
money center bank samples and for all banks combined for the first sample period, while Table 4
reflects results for the recovery period. It is interesting that small, medium, money center, and all
banks show opposite effects with regards to the impact of real GDP growth on net interest
margins when compared to the full sample case during the initial sample period. In the recovery
period, with the exception of money center and large banks, there is a large net positive effect of
real GDP growth on net interest margins. In sum, real GDP growth exerts a mixed impact on
bank net interest margins, seems sensitive to the time period under review, and its effect varies
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based on bank asset size. The influence of the yield curve on net interest margins remains
positive in the initial sample period (with no effect for large banks) and stays positive in the
recovery period for all bank sizes except for the money center banks. We conclude that the
impact of the yield curve on net interest margins is greater (based on the magnitude of the
coefficients) for small, medium, and all banks combined in our recovery period estimations when
compared to our initial period sample estimations.
The effect of inflation on net interest margins reported in the initial period in Table 3
resembles what is found in the full sample period with the exception of the large bank/(money
center) sample in which no effect is found in the initial/(full) sample. The effect becomes
positive across all bank samples in the recovery period as shown in Table 4 and is consistent
with the idea that banks successfully manage inflation expectations with the exception of the
non-impact for money center banks. Table 3 shows that the impact of deposits-to-loans on net
interest margins remains negative and small in the initial period for medium and large banks with
no effect detected for money center banks with the effect remaining positive yet negligible for
the small banks. In the recovery period an opposite effect is evident for medium, large, and all
banks when compared to the initial period and no impact of deposits-to-loans on net interest
margins for the money center banks. With respect to the interaction between deposits-to-loans
and inflation, results from the initial period reported in Table 3 display a similar pattern to those
reported in the full sample period while the effects from the medium and large banks dissipate
and the small and all bank effects turns negative in the recovery period in Table 4.12

12

In earlier stages of our research, we had explored alternative bank profitability models incorporating other
potentially important variables including for example: bank assets, net charge offs, liquidity, interest rate riskexposure, and Tier 1 risk-based capital as suggested in the banking literature (e.g., Angbazo (1997), Albertazzi and
Gambacorta (2009), Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011), and Bolt et al (2012)). In our initial model estimations (with
no lags), the R squares were low ranging from 0.009 for the medium bank sample to 0.025 for the small bank
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5. Concluding Remarks
The 2007-2009 financial crisis created havoc in the banking industry as evidenced by
substantial losses, significant market capital erosion, and major write-downs in lending
portfolios. Throughout the crisis, bank lending dampened (in part due to the exposure in their
real estate portfolios) while bank liquidity was rebuilt. The effects of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis have diminished and bank profitability has been restored.
Panel data methods are applied to a very large sample of U.S. banks categorized on asset size
that comprises 4,981 small banks, 475 medium banks, 34 large banks, and 14 money-center
banks to examine the sensitivity of bank profitability to fluctuations in the yield curve. Recent
research on bank profitability has either omitted the yield curve, such as Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero
(2011), or has used it in panel of countries together with long-term rates, such as Bolt et al.
(2012), or even used the short-term interest rate in combination with volatility as in Arnold and
van Ewijk (2012) for bank margins in Euro area countries. In an environment where short-term
rates became very close to zero after 2008, long-term rates and the yield curve almost coincide
(as shown in Figure 1 in this paper) and a modification of the empirical model is implemented to
better estimate the effects of yield curve (along with RGDP growth, inflation, and D/L ratios) on
bank profits (NIM). The near zero short-term interest rates exhibited in the U.S. after 2008 led
Apergis and Christou (2015) to examine bank lending channel (BLC) behavior over a sample
sample over the full sample period. With the aim of introducing a parsimonious model, we choose to follow Bolt et
al. (2012) while focusing on the U.S. banking system and employing quarterly data. The R squares on Bolt's et al.
(2012) net interest income estimations based on multiple countries and annual data range between 0.197 and 0.296.
It is noted that on their ROA estimations, the reported R squares range from 0.018 to 0.029 which are in line with
our reported results. The behavior of our random sample is plausibly triggering this statistical issue on model fit.
The low-R squares indicate that it is difficult to predict individual outcomes on bank profitability with any accuracy;
low R squares, however, are not uncommon, particularly when estimating bank behavior. The zero conditional mean
assumption (𝐸( 𝑢│𝑥1, 𝑥2,…,𝑥𝑘) = 0 is what determines whether we obtain unbiased estimators of the ceteris
paribus effects of the independent variables and the size of the R square has no direct bearing on this (refer to
Wooldridge (2003))
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period from 2000 to 2012 for a number of Eurozone commercial banks covering 8 countries.
Employing instrumental quantile regression methods to a forward-looking Taylor rule and
controlling for bank-specific characteristics, they show that the presence of the BLC was
confirmed at the mean of the estimations yet the results are substantially weaker at low-order
interest quartiles towards zero lower bound.
We conclude in this paper that in the full sample period the yield curve has a positive impact
on net interest margins that persists in the small and medium banks. The most likely explanation
is that the yield curve contains important information about the real economy. Kurmann and
Otrok (2013), for example, estimate vector auto regressions for the U.S. economy from 1959 to
2005 and conclude that the main driver of fluctuations in the slope of the term structure is news
about future TFP (total factor productivity), which as a measure of productivity growth adds
information to past real GDP growth. We also determine in this paper that the impact increases
in the recovery period for all bank sizes except for the money center sample. During the recovery
period, our sample banks recorded aggregate average annual net interest incomes of U.S. $42.8
billion, U.S. $65.2 billion, U.S. $60.9 billion, and U.S. $194.4 billion for small, medium, large,
and money center banks, respectively. Employing the yield curve’s mean impact of 0.0812 on
net margins (while holding all other factors constant) implies a favorable boost to bank profits of
U.S. $3.5 billion, U.S. $5.3 billion, U.S. $4.9 billion, and U.S. $15.8 billion, respectively. Our
results suggest net interest margins have stabilized for small and medium banks, are on the
decline for large and money-center banks in the post-crisis period, and, except for medium
banks, have not been restored to pre-crisis levels.
The findings in our paper have important implications. First, the trends in net interest
margins suggest that banks will need to remain increasingly focused on their asset liability
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management practices and develop innovative strategies to retain (and build) fee based revenue
sources. Second, the reduced cash flows driven by downward pressure on net interest margins
forces banks to retain profits and payout fewer dividends when Tier 1 capital buffers are below
required levels. Third, regulators must be cognizant of banks’ plausible shifts in profit seeking
behavior over time that could be linked to swings in the yield curve. While the impact seems to
vary based on bank size, we have documented the role of the yield curve in bank profitability
using a very large and comprehensive sample of U.S. banks. During the 2007-2009 financial
crisis period, we see that the magnitude of net interest margin erosion, while modest, is not
consistent across bank size with large banks experiencing the greatest decline; this behavior
implies a reassessment of pre-established safety and soundness regulatory guidelines. With
increasing credit risk, uncertainty in banks’ balance sheet values, net margin erosion, and
government intervention, banks’ have focused on liquidity building in the post crisis period.
The following questions remain for further research: Will we witness a loosening of bank
credit standards to promote bank lending (and by extension, bank profitability) to help revive the
economy? What about bank exposure to exogenous shocks such as foreign exchange and oil
risks and their impact on bank profits? How will an eventual subsequent contraction of the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, which should hypothetically have a negative impact on liquidity
in the financial system, impact bank profitability? These questions are at the forefront of ongoing
research on banks and the economy.

< Insert Tables 1 – 4 about here >
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics - Panels A and B
Panel A.1 Small Bank Subsample (Total Assets < U.S. $1 billion)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Net Interest Margin
315043
3.947
1.040
Assets
315043
224644
274391
Loans
315043
146246
187298
Deposits
315043
117180
134785

Min.
-2.260
207
0
0

Max.
72.640
17100000
13100000
9000408

Panel A.2 Small Bank Subsample (Total Assets < U.S. $1 billion), subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
184407
4.084
1.126
-2.260
72.640
Assets
184407
181340
164384
982
1565124
Loans
184407
120805
118601
0
1414196
Deposits
184407
89091
77131
0
1010823
Panel A.3 Small Bank Subsample (Total Assets < U.S. $1 billion), subsample 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
130636
3.754
0.871
-0.270
25.260
Assets
130636
285772
370194
207
17100000
Loans
130636
182159
250083
0
13100000
Deposits
130636
156831
180908
0
9000408
Panel B.1 Medium Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $1 billion and < U.S. $20 billion)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
29461
3.820
1.727
-3.570
34.770
Assets
29461
3451094
4547638
14217
71800000
Loans
29461
2276399
3087703
0
57100000
Deposits
29461
1414525
1926864
0
36900000
Panel B.2 Medium Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $1 billion and < U.S. $20 billion)
subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
17896
3.938
1.610
-0.050
30.940
Assets
17896
2555866
2995899
14217
23700000
Loans
17896
1707787
2097256
645
22300000
Deposits
17896
960948
1208440
0
15200000
Panel B.3 Medium Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $1 billion and < U.S. $20 billion)
subsample 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
11565
3.637
1.879
-3.570
34.770
Assets
11565
4836395
5969709
19046
71800000
Loans
11565
3156284
4025799
0
57100000
Deposits
11565
2116403
2527393
0
36900000
See the footnotes at end of table 1 which is continued on the next three pages
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics – continued - Panels C and D
Panel C.1 Large Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
2073
3.387
1.772
0.090
14.870
Assets
2073
50000000
40300000
393588
286000000
Loans
2073
29200000
23300000
5518
157000000
Deposits
2073
17500000
19000000
0
137000000
Panel C.2 Large Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion) subsample
2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
1229
3.502
1.754
0.090
13.160
Assets
1229
33100000
20000000
393588
118000000
Loans
1229
20100000
13000000
5518
67600000
Deposits
1229
9695763
8293462
0
51900000
Panel C.3 Large Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion) subsample
2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Net Interest Margin
844
3.220
1.786
0.090
14.870
Assets
844
74600000
48800000
14500000
286000000
Loans
844
42500000
28200000
3550942
157000000
Deposits
844
28900000
23900000
167000
137000000
Panel D.1 Money-center Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $90 billion)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Net Interest Margin
895
3.247
0.852
0.000
Assets
895
438000000
513000000
32500000
Loans
895
217000000
228000000
20200000
Deposits
895
99200000
125000000
227000

Max.
5.700
2120000000
934000000
582000000

Panel D.2 Money-center Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $90 billion)
subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Net Interest Margin
532
3.454
0.792
0.000
Assets
532
302000000
351000000
32500000
Loans
532
161000000
162000000
20200000
Deposits
532
61300000
65500000
227000

Max.
5.700
1770000000
728000000
352000000

Panel D.3 Money-center Bank Subsample (Total Assets ≥ U.S. $90 billion)
subsample 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Net Interest Margin
363
2.944
0.846
0.900
Assets
363
637000000
635000000
84000000
Loans
363
298000000
281000000
22400000
Deposits
363
155000000
165000000
816000

Max.
4.870
2120000000
934000000
582000000

See the footnotes at end of table 1 which is continued on the next two pages
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics - continued - Panel E
Panel E.1 All Banks
Variable
Net Interest Margin
Assets
Loans
Deposits

Obs.
347472
347472
347472
347472

Mean
3.931
1921746
1057591
586059

Std. Dev.
1.122
34600000
16200000
8347592

Min.
-3.570
207
0
0

Max.
72.640
2120000000
934000000
582000000

Std. Dev.
1.182
23800000
11800000
4692617

Min.
-2.260
982
0
0

Max.
72.640
1770000000
728000000
352000000

Panel E.3 All Banks Subsample 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Net Interest Margin
143408
3.740
1.000
Assets
143408
2700939
45700000
Loans
143408
1425746
21000000
Deposits
143408
875095
11700000
See the footnotes at end of table 1 which is continued on the next page

Min.
-3.570
207
0
0

Max.
34.770
2120000000
934000000
582000000

Panel E.2 All Banks Subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Net Interest Margin
204064
4.066
Assets
204064
1374160
Loans
204064
798866
Deposits
204064
382937
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics - continued - Panel F
Panel F.1 Macro-economic variables
Variable
Long Term Interest
Short Term Interest
Yield Curve
Real GDP Growth
Inflation

Obs.
68
68
68
68
68

Mean
3.668
1.697
1.972
0.005
0.002

Std. Dev.
1.215
1.909
1.118
0.006
0.003

Min.
1.563
0.013
-0.450
-0.021
-0.013

Max.
6.480
6.017
3.610
0.019
0.008

Panel F.2 Macro-economic variables Subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Long Term Interest
38
4.495
0.757
Short Term Interest
38
2.817
1.777
Yield Curve
38
1.679
1.273
Real GDP Growth
38
0.004
0.007
Inflation
38
0.002
0.004

Min.
2.737
0.173
-0.450
-0.021
-0.013

Max.
6.480
6.017
3.523
0.019
0.008

Panel F.3 Macro-economic variables 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Long Term Interest
30
2.491
Short Term Interest
30
0.103
Yield Curve
30
2.388
Real GDP Growth
30
0.006
Inflation
30
0.001

Min.
1.563
0.013
1.267
-0.005
-0.005

Max.
3.717
0.430
3.610
0.012
0.006

Std. Dev.
0.634
0.092
0.651
0.004
0.002

Notes Panels A through F: The bank variables assets, loans and deposits, are expressed in levels and in thousands of
dollars. The net interest margin is the total interest income less total interest expense (annualized) as a percent of
average earning assets. The loan variable includes total loans and leases net of unearned income and allowance. The
deposit variable consists of FDIC insured deposits. The sample covers from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4. The bank data was
downloaded from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDICs) statistics on depository institutions (SDI)
database: http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. The SDI information is extracted from quarterly call reports (FFIEC
form FFIEC-031 for banks with domestic and foreign offices or form FFIEC-041 for banks with domestic offices
only). The yield curve is defined as the difference between our long term interest rate measured through the 10-year
U.S. Treasury Bond Constant Maturity rate (series GS10) and our short term interest rate captured by the 3-month
U.S. Treasury Bill rate (series TB3MS) which are in monthly frequency and then averaged to quarterly frequency.
The real GDP growth rate variable is defined as the quarterly growth rate (calculated from the GDPC1 series - US
Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted). The inflation
variable is calculated as the quarterly average monthly percent change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers: All Items, Index 1982-1984=100, Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted. The macro variables were
downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis website http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 last accessed
on 05/14/2017.
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Table 2 Panel models by bank size. Dependent variable: net interest margin
Small Banks
Medium Banks
Real GDP growth t-1
0.731*** / (0.122)
2.195*** / (0.412)
Real GDP growth t-2
0.430*** / (0.110)
-0.311 / (0.433)
Real GDP growth t-3
-0.314*** / (0.113)
-0.383 / (0.421)
Real GDP growth t-4
-0.581*** / (0.198)
-1.731*** / (0.412)

Large Banks
5.754*** / (1.926)
-1.465 / (2.007)
0.372 / (1.962)
-4.490** / (1.934)

Money Center Banks
-3.480* / (2.035)
-5.586*** / (2.114)
3.728* / (2.051)
0.185 / (2.119)

All Banks
1.237*** / (0.110)
0.329*** / (0.088)
-0.075 / (0.075)
-0.326*** / (0.109)

Yield curve t-1
Yield curve t-2
Yield curve t-3
Yield curve t-4

-0.008*** / (0.002)
0.032*** / (0.002)
0.006** / (0.002)
0.005*** / (0.001)

-0.001 / (0.005)
0.019*** / (0.005)
0.023*** / (0.005)
-0.013** / (0.005)

0.030 / (0.026)
0.044* / (0.026)
0.053** / (0.026)
-0.035 / (0.025)

0.074*** / (0.026)
-0.045* / (0.027)
0.018 / (0.027)
-0.034 / (0.026)

-0.007*** / (0.001)
0.031*** / (0.002)
0.013*** / (0.002)
0.001 / (0.001)

Inflation t-1
Inflation t-2
Inflation t-3
Inflation t-4

7.455*** / (0.514)
-1.550*** / (0.395)
-5.946*** / (0.422)
-4.390*** / (0.333)

7.968*** / (1.522)
-3.207** / (1.630)
-5.076*** / (1.658)
-5.832*** / (1.660)

10.336** / (4.776)
-7.148 / (5.614)
-1.897 / (5.581)
-3.049 / (5.139)

12.022 / (9.350)
11.108 / (9.415)
11.708 / (9.467)
1.823 / (9.684)

4.621*** / (0.446)
-3.515*** / (0.333)
-6.639*** / (0.422)
-3.629*** / (0.203)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1*Inflation t-1
t-2*Inflation t-2
t-3*Inflation t-3
t-4*Inflation t-4

-0.732 / (0.528)
-0.502 / (0.625)
3.425*** / (0.420)
0.130 / (0.095)

-0.818 / (2.085)
2.962 / (2.276)
5.213** / (2.332)
6.169*** / (2.295)

-4.501 / (5.627)
5.873 / (7.608)
3.242 / (7.720)
12.404* / (6.460)

-61.142*** / (20.578)
-42.098** / (20.548)
-22.209 / (20.715)
-27.598 / (21.066)

2.436*** / (0.484)
2.259*** / (0.366)
3.997*** / (0.476)
0.109 / (0.086)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4

-0.164** / (0.072)
0.190*** / (0.069)
-0.005*** / (0.001)
-0.004*** / (0.000)

-0.001 / (0.001)
-0.005 / (0.006)
-0.122*** / (0.027)
0.128*** / (0.028)

0.023** / (0.011)
-0.002 / (0.013)
-0.025* / (0.013)
-0.009 / (0.009)

0.012 / (0.355)
0.676 / (0.487)
-0.114 / (0.469)
-0.303 / (0.333)

-0.002 / (0.002)
0.006** / (0.003)
-0.007*** / (0.001)
-0.004*** / (0.000)

-0.022*** / (0.006)

-0.017* / (0.009)

-0.015 / (0.026)

-0.059 / (0.053)

-0.006*** / (0.001)

0.390
1.000
1.919
0.738
231.690
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0235; 0.0068; 0.0227

0.400
1.000
2.203
0.403
23.890
0.200
0.000
1.000
random
0.0136; 0.0621; 0.0137

0.380
0.999
2.288
0.234
1.270
1.000
0.000
1.000
random
0.0296; 0.0193; 0.0295

0.070
1.000
2.682
0.005
0.230
1.000
0.000
1.000
random
0.0765; 0.0632; 0.0764

0.390
1.000
1.961
0.872
132.940
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0175; 0.0129; 0.0174

Constant
Bank specific effects - F statistic
Probability > F
Durbin Watson d statistic
Probability > Std Normal N (0,1)
Hausman Test-Chi square
Prob > Chi-square
Breusch Pagan Test Statistic
Prob > Chi-square
Pooled OLS/Fixed/Random Effectsa
R2 within; between; overall
a

selected model based on test results
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Table 2 notes: Sample period 2000Q1-2016Q4. The dependent variable net interest margin consists of the difference between total interest income and total interest expense
scaled by bank average earning assets. The bank deposits-to-loans variable is expressed in ratio form. We apply an F test to assess bank specific effects; null hypothesis common
intercept α for all banks (i.e. no bank specific effects). We run a Durbin Watson (DW) test to check for serial correlation in error terms; DW d statistic values close to 2 suggest
non-serially correlated errors; null hypothesis of zero first-order autocorrelation; asymptotically, d statistic follows a standard normal distribution. We employ Hausman tests to
determine whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate specification. The statistic is Chi-square distributed; the null hypothesis is that coefficients estimated by random
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. We implement a Breusch Pagan (BP) test on our random effects model based on OLS residuals;
null hypothesis is that variance across banks is zero. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, *** refer to the levels of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. There are 4,981 small banks, 475 medium banks, 34 large banks, and 14 money center banks as of the beginning of the sample period. There are 290,124, 27,075,
1,903, and 825 observations, respectively. The “All Banks” column contains 5,504 banks and 319,927 observations.
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Table 3 Panel models by bank size. Dependent variable: net interest margin, subsample 2000Q1 through 2009Q2
Small Banks
Medium Banks
Large Banks
Real GDP growth t-1
0.791*** / (0.149)
1.773*** / (0.501)
6.342** / (2.813)
Real GDP growth t-2
0.135 / (0.151)
-0.978* / (0.570)
-2.920 / (3.194)
Real GDP growth t-3
-1.687*** / (0.149)
-1.258* / (0.673)
2.381 / (3.811)
Real GDP growth t-4
-0.395** / (0.170)
-0.470 / (0.633)
-2.088 / (3.591)
Yield curve t-1
Yield curve t-2
Yield curve t-3
Yield curve t-4
Inflation t-1
Inflation t-2
Inflation t-3
Inflation t-4

Money Center Banks
-3.100 / (3.350)
-4.837 / (3.802)
9.785** / (4.493)
-2.477 / (4.187)

All Banks
1.083*** / (0.155)
-0.002 / (0.145)
-1.451*** / (0.147)
-0.458*** / (0.164)

-0.003 / (0.002)
0.016*** / (0.002)
-0.005* / (0.003)
0.014*** / (0.001)

0.003 / (0.006)
0.015** / (0.007)
0.025*** / (0.007)
-0.009 / (0.006)

0.046 / (0.035)
0.053 / (0.041)
0.017 / (0.038)
0.015 / (0.035)

0.098** / (0.041)
-0.040 / (0.047)
-0.020 / (0.044)
-0.053 / (0.040)

-0.002 / (0.002)
0.015*** / (0.002)
0.000 / (0.002)
0.011*** / (0.001)

8.387*** / (0.753)
-0.778* / (0.457)
-12.539*** / (0.669)
-6.993*** / (0.405)

2.058 / (1.845)
-6.203*** / (1.883)
-13.629*** / (2.393)
-14.634*** / (2.476)

7.303 / (6.324)
-7.772 / (7.721)
-9.310 / (9.086)
-7.960 / (8.840)

34.638** / (15.510)
18.956 / (15.304)
34.607 / (22.287)
25.869 / (23.205)

6.917*** / (0.742)
-2.684*** / (0.476)
-11.850*** / (0.670)
-6.652*** / (0.397)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1*Inflation t-1
t-2*Inflation t-2
t-3*Inflation t-3
t-4*Inflation t-4

-5.487*** / (0.883)
-2.105*** / (0.567)
7.778*** / (0.707)
0.123 / (0.095)

7.209*** / (2.744)
9.215*** / (2.771)
14.435*** / (3.388)
17.293*** / (3.326)

-5.883 / (7.049)
11.026 / (10.634)
13.036 / (12.200)
21.621** / (8.963)

-140.514*** / (36.234)
-79.713** / (35.496)
-94.810* / (52.235)
-96.532* / (52.780)

-3.472*** / (0.861)
1.219** / (0.612)
6.952*** / (0.712)
0.135 / (0.108)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4

-0.338*** / (0.027)
0.359*** / (0.027)
-0.009*** / (0.001)
-0.006*** / (0.000)

0.030 / (0.037)
-0.341*** / (0.052)
0.203*** / (0.051)
0.014 / (0.038)

0.021 / (0.014)
-0.011 / (0.018)
-0.041** / (0.017)
-0.019 / (0.012)

0.293 / (0.623)
1.136 / (0.889)
-0.456 / (0.889)
0.001 / (0.664)

-0.015 / (0.035)
0.025 / (0.033)
-0.010*** / (0.001)
-0.006*** / (0.000)

0.016*** / (0.006)

0.050*** / (0.016)

-0.016 / (0.060)

-0.293* / (0.150)

0.023*** / (0.005)

0.390
1.000
1.810
0.434
55.170
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0274; 0.1098; 0.0279

0.310
1.000
2.144
0.553
0.780
1.000
0.000
1.000
random
0.0218; 0.0748; 0.0223

0.170
1.000
2.325
0.180
0.780
1.000
0.000
1.000
random
0.0353; 0.1180; 0.0355

0.070
1.000
2.756
0.002
0.900
1.000
0.000
1.000
random
0.1244; 0.0757; 0.1239

0.380
1.000
1.847
0.527
57.820
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0190; 0.0696; 0.0192

Constant
Bank specific effects - F statistic
Probability > F
Durbin Watson d statistic
Probability > Std Normal N (0,1)
Hausman Test-Chi square
Prob > Chi-square
Breusch Pagan Test Statistic
Prob > Chi-square
Pooled OLS/Fixed/Random Effectsa
R2 within; between; overall
a

selected model based on test results
For extended notes refer to Table 2. Sample period 2000Q1-2009Q2. There are 4,981 small banks, 475 medium banks, 34 large banks, and 14 money center banks as of the
beginning of the sample period. There are 159,497, 15,521, 1,059, and 462 observations, respectively. The “All Banks” column contains 5,504 banks and 176,539 observations.
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Table 4 Panel models by bank size. Dependent variable: net interest margin, subsample 2009Q3 through 2016Q4
Small Banks
Medium Banks
Large Banks
Real GDP growth t-1
3.545*** / (0.266)
5.726*** / (1.548)
6.638* / (3.326)
Real GDP growth t-2
1.962*** / (0.171)
2.143*** / (0.743)
1.273 / (2.203)
Real GDP growth t-3
0.175 / (0.118)
-0.202 / (0.535)
-1.248 / (1.500)
Real GDP growth t-4
-2.268*** / (0.256)
-5.376** / (2.304)
-6.407** / (2.962)

Money Center Banks
2.072 / (1.801)
-0.425 / (2.369)
-1.570 / (1.041)
-2.094 / (1.814)

All Banks
3.937*** / (0.216)
1.947*** / (0.169)
0.138 / (0.118)
-2.276*** / (0.240)

Yield curve t-1
Yield curve t-2
Yield curve t-3
Yield curve t-4

-0.028*** / (0.003)
0.048*** / (0.003)
0.030*** / (0.004)
-0.016*** / (0.003)

-0.009 / (0.009)
0.017 / (0.016)
0.051*** / (0.015)
-0.024 / (0.016)

-0.011 / (0.013)
0.034 / (0.021)
0.081** / (0.035)
-0.102 / (0.068)

-0.036** / (0.014)
0.018 / (0.025)
0.024 / (0.017)
-0.032 / (0.026)

-0.025*** / (0.002)
0.043*** / (0.003)
0.036*** / (0.002)
-0.020*** / (0.002)

Inflation t-1
Inflation t-2
Inflation t-3
Inflation t-4

14.157*** / (0.851)
-1.712** / (0.706)
-3.207*** / (0.574)
-2.377*** / (0.547)

11.648*** / (4.331)
-6.125** / (2.921)
-7.227 / (7.869)
-4.351* / (2.395)

15.252** / (6.449)
-0.223 / (5.380)
6.051 / (8.058)
7.169 / (9.142)

14.336 / (9.463)
15.925 / (19.790)
8.289 / (8.300)
1.117 / (5.689)

13.120*** / (0.908)
-2.525*** / (0.699)
-3.644*** / (0.635)
-2.050*** / (0.554)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1*Inflation t-1
t-2*Inflation t-2
t-3*Inflation t-3
t-4*Inflation t-4

-0.059 / (0.738)
-2.013*** / (0.688)
-2.036*** / (0.459)
-2.746*** / (0.473)

4.077 / (7.315)
4.414 / (3.365)
4.480 / (9.905)
2.592 / (3.522)

2.353 / (8.624)
-4.757 / (3.795)
-6.233 / (9.114)
-5.195 / (8.690)

-15.042 / (19.761)
-44.073 / (35.112)
-20.764 / (13.997)
-20.148* / (9.950)

0.671 / (0.857)
-0.879 / (0.688)
-1.798*** / (0.588)
-2.722*** / (0.514)

Deposits t-1/Loans
Deposits t-2/Loans
Deposits t-3/Loans
Deposits t-4/Loans

t-1
t-2
t-3
t-4

-0.095 / (0.063)
0.078 / (0.054)
0.087*** / (0.014)
-0.024** / (0.012)

-0.001*** / (0.000)
0.008 / (0.019)
-0.158** / (0.064)
0.327** / (0.161)

-0.099 / (0.238)
0.561* / (0.289)
-0.647 / (0.396)
0.263 / (0.217)

-0.496 / (0.587)
0.470 / (0.430)
0.375 / (0.337)
-0.134 / (0.190)

-0.002* / (0.001)
-0.001 / (0.002)
0.069*** / (0.017)
-0.004 / (0.017)

-0.072*** / (0.011)

-0.163* / (0.092)

-0.087* / (0.050)

-0.113 / (0.110)

-0.090*** / (0.010)

0.680
1.000
2.125
0.605
183.800
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0342; 0.0054; 0.0275

0.590
1.000
2.250
0.302
48.460
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0180; 0.0022; 0.0069

1.360
0.094
2.181
0.456
37.680
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0641; 0.0016; 0.0556

1.610
0.079
1.650
0.149
393.900
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.1262; 0.0316; 0.1094

0.380
1.000
2.144
0.552
321.470
0.000
0.000
1.000
fixed
0.0269; 0.0089; 0.0172

Constant
Bank specific effects - F statistic
Probability > F
Durbin Watson d statistic
Probability > Std Normal N (0,1)
Hausman Test-Chi square
Prob > Chi-square
Breusch Pagan Test Statistic
Prob > Chi-square
Pooled OLS/Fixed/Random Effectsa
R2 within; between; overall
a

selected model based on test results
For extended notes refer to Table 2. Sample period 2009Q3-2016Q4. There are 4,956 small banks, 467 medium banks, 31 large banks, and 14 money center banks as of the
beginning of the sample period. There are 130,627, 11,554, 844, and 363 observations, respectively. The “All Banks” column contains 5,468 banks and 143,388 observations
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Figure 1 Yield Curve with Long-term and Short-term rates
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The yield curve is defined as the difference between the 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond Constant Maturity rate (series
GS10) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate (series TB3MS) which are in monthly frequency downloadable from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on 5/14/2/2017), then
averaged to quarterly frequency. The U.S. recessionary periods are quarterly frequency (USRECQ) per NBER
downloaded from http:// research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on 5/14/2017).

Figure 2 Net Interest Margin by Bank Size
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Net Interest Margin (NIM) is defined as the difference between total interest income and total interest expense
which is divided by average earning assets. The variables are measured in quarterly frequency and downloaded from
FDICs SDIs website http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. US recessionary periods are quarterly frequency
(USRECQ) per NBER downloaded from http:// research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on 5/14/2017).

